

Tilman BÃ¶rgers

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/9214998/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

20
papers

1,489
citations

623734

14
h-index

794594

19
g-index

20
all docs

20
docs citations

20
times ranked

804
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Strategically Simple Mechanisms. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2019, 87, 2003-2035.	4.2	26
2	A counterexample to Dhillon (1998). <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2017, 48, 837-843.	0.8	6
3	(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007). <i>Review of Economic Design</i> , 2017, 21, 73-82.	0.3	10
4	An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 159, 1056-1073.	1.1	11
5	An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. , 2015, , .		196
6	Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2014, 9, 339-360.	0.8	18
7	When are signals complements or substitutes?. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2013, 148, 165-195.	1.1	30
8	Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2013, 5, 163-187.	1.2	48
9	Robustly Ranking Mechanisms. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2012, 102, 325-329.	8.5	20
10	Efficient compromising. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2009, 144, 2057-2076.	1.1	30
11	A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2009, 39, 477-489.	0.9	35
12	Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2005, 115, 551-578.	3.6	45
13	Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2004, 72, 383-405.	4.2	30
14	Costly Voting. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2004, 94, 57-66.	8.5	176
15	Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations. <i>International Economic Review</i> , 2000, 41, 921-950.	1.3	136
16	Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1997, 77, 1-14.	1.1	507
17	On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 1996, 106, 1374.	3.6	28
18	Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1994, 64, 265-276.	1.1	87

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model. Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59, 163.	5.4	30
20	Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991, 20, 89-106.	0.8	20