## Tilman Börgers

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/9214998/publications.pdf

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20 1,489 14
papers citations h-index

20

docs citations

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20 804
times ranked citing authors

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 77, 1-14.	1.1	507
2	An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. , 2015, , .		196
3	Costly Voting. American Economic Review, 2004, 94, 57-66.	8.5	176
4	Naive Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations. International Economic Review, 2000, 41, 921-950.	1.3	136
5	Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge. Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 64, 265-276.	1.1	87
6	Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, 5, 163-187.	1.2	48
7	Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction. Economic Journal, 2005, 115, 551-578.	3.6	45
8	A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types. Economic Theory, 2009, 39, 477-489.	0.9	35
9	Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model. Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59, 163.	5.4	30
10	Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules. Econometrica, 2004, 72, 383-405.	4.2	30
11	Efficient compromising. Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, 2057-2076.	1.1	30
12	When are signals complements or substitutes?. Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148, 165-195.	1.1	30
13	On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory. Economic Journal, 1996, 106, 1374.	3.6	28
14	Strategically Simple Mechanisms. Econometrica, 2019, 87, 2003-2035.	4.2	26
15	Upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1991, 20, 89-106.	0.8	20
16	Robustly Ranking Mechanisms. American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 325-329.	8.5	20
17	Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules. Theoretical Economics, 2014, 9, 339-360.	0.8	18
18	An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 159, 1056-1073.	1.1	11

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007). Review of Economic Design, 2017, 21, 73-82.	0.3	10
20	A counterexample to Dhillon (1998). Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, 48, 837-843.	0.8	6