

Tomas Sjostrom

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/8538478/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

40
papers

1,572
citations

394421

19
h-index

361022

35
g-index

40
all docs

40
docs citations

40
times ranked

824
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	The Strategy and Technology of Conflict. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2020, 128, 3186-3219.	4.5	6
2	Sovereign debt: election concerns and the democratic disadvantage. <i>Oxford Economic Papers</i> , 2019, 71, 320-343.	1.2	8
3	Mechanism Design (New Developments). , 2018, , 8644-8653.		0
4	Why Do Irrelevant Alternatives Matter? An fMRI-TMS Study of Context-Dependent Preferences. <i>Journal of Neuroscience</i> , 2017, 37, 11647-11661.	3.6	17
5	The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2012, 102, 2897-2922.	8.5	56
6	Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2011, 78, 458-486.	5.4	45
7	The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games. <i>Games</i> , 2010, 1, 66-88.	0.6	4
8	Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game*. <i>Review of International Economics</i> , 2009, 17, 304-309.	1.3	8
9	Intuition and Deliberation: Two Systems for Strategizing in the Brain. <i>Science</i> , 2009, 324, 519-522.	12.6	123
10	Contracting with Third Parties. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2009, 1, 75-100.	1.2	17
11	Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2008, 116, 1023-1057.	4.5	60
12	Mechanism Design (New Developments). , 2008, , 1-9.		9
13	Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2007, 137, 27-48.	1.1	79
14	Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2006, 57, 206-235.	0.8	67
15	Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games. <i>Journal of Mathematical Economics</i> , 2006, 42, 771-793.	0.8	14
16	Public Debt, Migration, and Shortsighted Politicians. <i>Journal of Public Economic Theory</i> , 2004, 6, 655-674.	1.1	19
17	Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2004, 71, 217-234.	5.4	116
18	Arms Races and Negotiations. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2004, 71, 351-369.	5.4	124

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities. Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 43, 196-213.	0.8	32
20	Chapter 5 Implementation theory. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, , 237-288.	0.9	145
21	Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes. RAND Journal of Economics, 2001, 32, 27.	2.3	23
22	Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives. Review of Economic Studies, 2001, 68, 781-810.	5.4	56
23	Local public goods, debt and migration. Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 80, 313-337.	4.3	38
24	Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages and Involuntary Unemployment. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2000, 102, 669-688.	1.4	12
25	Trade as transfers, GATT and the core. Economics Letters, 2000, 66, 163-169.	1.9	8
26	Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation. Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 26, 337-352.	0.8	8
27	Interactive Implementation. Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 27, 38-63.	0.8	12
28	Decentralization and Collusion. Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, 83, 196-232.	1.1	112
29	On the Convergence of Fictitious Play. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1998, 23, 479-511.	1.3	60
30	The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player. Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 77, 15-33.	1.1	50
31	Competition and the evolution of efficiency. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1996, 30, 25-43.	2.0	34
32	Profit Sharing, Employment Efficiency and Wage Stability. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1995, 97, 281.	1.4	4
33	Implementation and information in teams. Economic Design, 1994, 1, 327-341.	0.3	12
34	Implementation by demand mechanisms. Economic Design, 1994, 1, 343-354.	0.3	23
35	Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, 502-511.	0.8	52
36	Bringing GATT into the Core. Economica, 1994, 61, 301.	1.6	26

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	Implementation in perfect equilibria. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 1993, 10, 97.	0.8	21
38	A new characterization of the Groves- Clarke mechanism. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1991, 36, 263-267.	1.9	3
39	StÅhl's bargaining model. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1991, 36, 153-157.	1.9	9
40	On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 1991, 8, 333.	0.8	60