

# Daniel J Seidmann

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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24  
papers

589  
citations

840776

11  
h-index

839539

18  
g-index

24  
all docs

24  
docs citations

24  
times ranked

230  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1997, 65, 163.	4.2	113
2	Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1993, 60, 306-321.	1.1	91
3	A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1998, 65, 793-815.	5.4	90
4	Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1990, 50, 445-458.	1.1	52
5	Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2007, 59, 296-315.	0.8	40
6	The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege. <i>Harvard Law Review</i> , 2000, 114, 430.	0.2	38
7	Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2015, 82, 825-867.	5.4	35
8	Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning. <i>Journal of International Economics</i> , 2009, 79, 143-159.	3.0	30
9	Bargaining over an endogenous agenda. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2014, 9, 445-482.	0.8	24
10	A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2011, 36, 49-74.	0.8	23
11	The Effects of a Right to Silence. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2005, 72, 593-614.	5.4	19
12	The Formateurs'™ Role in Government Formation. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2007, 31, 427-445.	0.9	9
13	Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1992, 4, 422-425.	0.8	8
14	Protecting buyers from fine print. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 2016, 89, 42-54.	2.3	7
15	Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 2008, 92, 448-455.	4.3	4
16	Corruption and power in democracies. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2014, 42, 707-734.	0.8	3
17	Target buffer stocks. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1985, 27, 165-182.	2.3	2
18	Optimal Quotas in Private Committees. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2008, 118, 16-36.	3.6	1

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Asymmetric price adjustment and information. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1982, 10, 17-21.	1.9	0
20	Anticipatory pricing with negligible uncertainty. <i>Economics Letters</i> , 1987, 25, 213-216.	1.9	0
21	The Impact of Interest Rates on Price and Supply. <i>Canadian Journal of Economics</i> , 1987, 20, 625.	1.2	0
22	The real effects of nominal price rigidity. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1989, 33, 1831-1838.	2.3	0
23	Why are idiosyncratic goods produced to order?. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1992, 56, 228-232.	1.1	0
24	Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 2006, 50, 1043-1060.	2.3	0