Giacomo Bonanno

List of Publications by Year
in descending order

58	969	623734	477307
58	**969**	**14**	**29**
papers	citations	h-index	g-index

68	**68**	**68**	**395**
all docs	docs citations	times ranked	citing authors

#	Article	IF	Citations
1	Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1998, 16, 495-510.	1.2	179
2	Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory. Research in Economics, 1999, 53, 149-225.	0.8	131
3	Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence. Review of Economic Studies, 1987, 54, 37.	5.4	125
4	GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION. Journal of Economic Surveys, 1990, 4, 297-328.	6.6	52
5	How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, 28, 409-434.	0.5	39
6	Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic. Artificial Intelligence, 2007, 171, 144-160.	5.8	36
7	Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 1985, 35, 276-283.	1.1	34
8	Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988, 103, 555.	8.6	31
9	Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction. Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 36, 57-73.	0.8	26
10	Memory and perfect recall in extensive games. Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 47, 237-256.	0.8	21
11	Modal logic and game theory: two alternative approaches. Risk, Decision and Policy, 2002, 7, 309-324.	0.1	19
12	On the Logic of Common Belief. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 1996, 42, 305-311.	0.2	18
13	The Logic of Belief Persistence. Economics and Philosophy, 1997, 13, 39-59.	0.3	18
14	Rational choice and AGM belief revision. Artificial Intelligence, 2009, 173, 1194-1203.	5.8	17
15	A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision. Synthảse, 2005, 147, 193-228.	1.1	16
16	AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties. International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, 42, 567-592.	0.5	13
17	A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals. Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, 78, 31-43.	0.8	12
18	Rational beliefs in extensive games. Theory and Decision, 1992, 33, 153-176.	1.0	11

#	Article	IF	Citations
19	Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information. Mathematical Social Sciences, 1998, 36, 3-29.	0.5	11
20	Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games. Research in Economics, 1999, 53, 77-99.	0.8	10
21	Information, Knowledge and Belief. Bulletin of Economic Research, 2002, 54, 47-67.	1.1	10
22	Divergence of choices despite similarity of characteristics: An application of catastrophe theory. European Journal of Operational Research, 1988, 36, 379-392.	5.7	9
23	Players' information in extensive games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 1992, 24, 35-48.	0.5	9
24	The logical representation of extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1993, 22, 153-169.	0.5	8
25	On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief. Mathematical Social Sciences, 1998, 35, 17-36.	0.5	8
26	Reasoning About Strategies and Rational Play in Dynamic Games. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015, , 34-62.	1.3	8
27	On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games. Theory and Decision, 1998, 45, 291-295.	1.0	7
28	Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 2000, 46, 49-52.	0.2	7
29	Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-consistency and Iterated Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2012, 41, 201-236.	0.9	7
30	Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, 112, 231-241.	0.8	7
31	A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision. , 2005, , 139-174.		7
32	Entry deterrence with uncertain entry and uncertain observability of commitment. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1988, 6, 351-362.	1.2	6
33	AGM belief revision in dynamic games. , 2011, , .		6
34	Logic and Game Theory. Outstanding Contributions To Logic, 2014, , 421-449.	0.3	5
35	A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games. Research in Economics, 2003, 57, 201-217.	0.8	4
36	Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction. International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, 47, 1001-1032.	0.5	4

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	Credible Information, Allowable Information and Belief Revision - Extended Abstract. Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS, 0, 297, 82-90.	0.8	4
38	Extensive forms and set-theoretic forms. Economics Letters, 1991, 37, 363-370.	1.9	3
39	A Characterization of von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory. SynthÃˆse, 2004, 139, 281-295.	1.1	3
40	Temporal Interaction of Information and Belief. Studia Logica, 2007, 86, 375-401.	0.6	3
41	Special Issue on Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Journal of Applied Logic, 2009, 7, 363.	1.1	3
42	A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction. Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 88, 221-241.	0.8	3
43	AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory, 2016, 45, 1071-1094.	0.5	3
44	Memory of Past Beliefs and Actions. Studia Logica, 2003, 75, 7-30.	0.6	2
45	Logics for Belief as Maximally Plausible Possibility. Studia Logica, 2020, 108, 1019-1061.	0.6	2
46	Prediction in Branching Time Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 2001, 47, 239-247.	0.2	1
47	Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction. Bulletin of Economic Research, 2001, 53, 215-217.	1.1	1
48	Editorial Introduction to the Special Issue LOFT Sevilla. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2013, 42, 795-798.	0.9	1
49	Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium. Games, 2016, 7, 35.	0.6	1
50	The Material Conditional is Sufficient to Model Deliberation. Erkenntnis, 0, , 1.	0.9	1
51	Can good news lead to a more pessimistic choice of action?. Theory and Decision, 1988, 25, 123-136.	1.0	0
52	The coverability problem in input-output systems. Economics Letters, 1993, 43, 15-21.	1.9	0
53	Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements. Ricerche Economiche, 1994, 48, 23-43.	0.2	0
54	Reply to 'Social Cost and Groves Mechanisms'. Economic Notes, 2002, 31, 175-178.	0.4	0

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55	Logic and the Foundations of the Theory of Games and Decisions: Introduction*. SynthÃˆse, 2005, 147, 189-192.	1.1	0
56	Introduction to the Special Section on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT12). B E Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2018, 18, .	0.2	0
57	Introduction to the Special Issue on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT12). Studia Logica, 2019, 107, 451-455.	0.6	0
58	A Characterization of Von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory. , 2004, , 117-131.		0