

George Tsebelis

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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64
papers

11,048
citations

109321

35
h-index

123424

61
g-index

72
all docs

72
docs citations

72
times ranked

2594
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Constitutional Rigidity Matters: A Veto Players Approach. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> , 2022, 52, 280-299.	3.1	8
2	Nested Games. , 2019, , .		36
3	How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba”? <i>Homo Oeconomicus</i> , 2018, 35, 81-90.	0.2	3
4	Compromesso storico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform. <i>Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica</i> , 2017, 47, 87-104.	0.7	5
5	The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i> , 2017, 56, 820-845.	4.1	22
6	A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> , 2016, 46, 457-478.	3.1	52
7	A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries “ CORRIGENDUM. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> , 2016, 46, 479-480.	3.1	1
8	Lessons from the Greek crisis. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> , 2016, 23, 25-41.	4.0	56
9	Coalition theory: a veto players™ approach. <i>European Political Science Review</i> , 2014, 6, 331-357.	1.9	17
10	Suspending vetoes: how the euro countries achieved unanimity in the fiscal compact. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> , 2014, 21, 1388-1411.	4.0	26
11	Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decisionmaking in the EU. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i> , 2013, 20, 1083-1103.	4.0	28
12	The Rules of Decisionmaking in EU Institutions. , 2012, , .		2
13	Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas. <i>Journal of Politics in Latin America</i> , 2011, 3, 3-28.	0.7	77
14	Agenda Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics. , 2009, , 13-24.		12
15	Thinking about the Recent Past and the Future of the EU*. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i> , 2008, 46, 265-292.	2.1	17
16	Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> , 2007, 40, 1155-1182.	3.6	25
17	The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i> , 2007, 45, 157-186.	2.1	43
18	Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America. <i>World Politics</i> , 2005, 57, 396-420.	1.9	74

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19	The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Draft and the Constitution for Europe Under a Veto Players Analysis. <i>European Constitutional Law Review</i> , 2005, 1, 429-451.	0.5	11
20	Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i> , 2004, 43, 449-476.	4.1	125
21	Chapitre 5. Institutional analyses of the european union. , 2004, , 117-141.		0
22	Veto Players and Referendums Around the World. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2002, 14, 465-515.	0.4	124
23	Veto Players and Decisionâ€making in the EU After Nice. <i>Journal of Common Market Studies</i> , 2002, 40, 283-307.	2.1	80
24	Veto Players and Referendums Around the World. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2002, 14, 465-515.	0.4	46
25	Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2001, 13, 99-105.	0.4	45
26	The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union. <i>International Organization</i> , 2001, 55, 357-390.	4.7	343
27	Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> , 2001, 31, .	3.1	94
28	Veto Players and Institutional Analysis. <i>Governance</i> , 2000, 13, 441-474.	2.0	295
29	Legislative Politics in the European Union. <i>European Union Politics</i> , 2000, 1, 9-36.	2.1	449
30	Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit. , 2000, , 16-47.		15
31	Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 1999, 93, 591-608.	3.7	473
32	The European parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i> , 1999, 36, 119-154.	4.1	79
33	The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i> , 1999, 36, 119-154.	4.1	23
34	Coalition Formation in the European Parliament. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> , 1999, 32, 933-966.	3.6	243
35	More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 1999, 11, 331-338.	0.4	42
36	Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 1999, 11, 291-308.	0.4	126

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37	The history of conditional agenda-setting in European institutions. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i> , 1998, 33, 41-71.	4.1	1
38	The history of conditional agenda-setting in european institutions. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i> , 1998, 33, 41-71.	4.1	109
39	More on the coâ€decision endgame. <i>Journal of Legislative Studies, The</i> , 1997, 3, 139-143.	0.7	47
40	Agenda setting, vetoes and the european union's coâ€decision procedure. <i>Journal of Legislative Studies, The</i> , 1997, 3, 74-92.	0.7	127
41	Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European Union. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i> , 1996, 16, 345-361.	0.8	104
42	More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: Response to Moser. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 1996, 90, 839-844.	3.7	110
43	An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism. <i>International Organization</i> , 1996, 50, 269-299.	4.7	398
44	The political power of the french senate: Micromechanisms of bicameral negotiations. <i>Journal of Legislative Studies, The</i> , 1995, 1, 192-217.	0.7	5
45	Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> , 1995, 25, 101-129.	3.1	40
46	Conditional agendaâ€setting and decisionâ€makinginsidethe European parliament. <i>Journal of Legislative Studies, The</i> , 1995, 1, 65-93.	0.7	125
47	Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> , 1995, 25, 289-325.	3.1	2,079
48	Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament. <i>European and Transatlantic Studies</i> , 1995, , 42-64.	0.2	3
49	Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective. <i>Political Research Quarterly</i> , 1994, 47, 793-820.	1.7	7
50	The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 1994, 88, 128-142.	3.7	605
51	Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective. <i>Political Research Quarterly</i> , 1994, 47, 793.	1.7	1
52	Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 1993, 5, 349-374.	0.4	26
53	Cicero's Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective. <i>International Political Science Review</i> , 1992, 13, 25-43.	2.8	27
54	The Effect of Fines on Regulated Industries. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 1991, 3, 81-101.	0.4	29

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55	Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?. American Political Science Review, 1990, 84, 569-586.	3.7	37
56	Are Sanctions Effective?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1990, 34, 3-28.	2.0	121
57	Penalty has no Impact on Crime:. Rationality and Society, 1990, 2, 255-286.	1.1	110
58	Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Democracies. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1990, 2, 5-29.	0.4	121
59	The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy. American Political Science Review, 1989, 83, 77-91.	3.7	168
60	Coercion and revolution: Variations on a predator-prey model. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 1989, 12, 547-559.	2.0	30
61	When Do Allies Become Rivals?. Comparative Politics, 1988, 20, 233.	1.1	7
62	Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions. British Journal of Political Science, 1988, 18, 145-170.	3.1	42
63	A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting. British Journal of Political Science, 1986, 16, 395-404.	3.1	37
64	Multiple vote electoral systems: a remedy for political polarization. Journal of European Public Policy, 0, , 1-21.	4.0	1