

# Zvika Neeman

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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54  
papers

1,216  
citations

471509

17  
h-index

454955

30  
g-index

55  
all docs

55  
docs citations

55  
times ranked

618  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	How Bayesian Persuasion Can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14, 186-215.	1.2	6
2	Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13, 238-272.	1.2	4
3	The rarity of consistent aggregators. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, 108, 146-149.	0.5	0
4	The benefit of collective reputation. RAND Journal of Economics, 2019, 50, 787-821.	2.3	14
5	Differential Performance in High Versus Low Stakes Tests: Evidence from the Gre Test*. Economic Journal, 2019, 129, 2916-2948.	3.6	17
6	Consumer Fraud, Misrepresentation and Reliance. International Review of Law and Economics, 2018, 54, 95-105.	0.8	1
7	Geography, Transparency, and Institutions. American Political Science Review, 2017, 111, 622-636.	3.7	42
8	Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach. Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, 44, S133-S159.	0.4	17
9	Personality traits and strategic behavior: Anxiousness and aggressiveness in entry games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014, 42, 136-147.	2.2	7
10	Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design. Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148, 473-501.	1.1	20
11	Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?. Journal of Legal Studies, 2013, 42, 369-397.	0.4	9
12	Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital. Economic Journal, 2012, 122, 933-956.	3.6	101
13	STATUS AND POVERTY. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, 8, 413-420.	3.5	33
14	THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT <sup>*</sup> . Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, 58, 642-660.	1.3	13
15	Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets. B E Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010, 10, .	0.2	16
16	Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics. Review of Financial Studies, 2010, 23, 1089-1119.	6.8	88
17	Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009, 7, 377-387.	3.5	43
18	Corruption and Openness. B E Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2008, 8, .	0.9	24

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i> , 2008, 164, 52-67.	0.2	1
20	Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. <i>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</i> , 2008, 164, 130-133.	0.2	0
21	Robustness against inefficient manipulation. <i>Social Choice and Welfare</i> , 2007, 29, 55-67.	0.8	0
22	Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2006, 56, 121-134.	0.8	18
23	On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2006, 74, 213-233.	4.2	75
24	On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i> , 2006, 26, 536-556.	0.8	23
25	Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach. <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i> , 2005, 21, 285-314.	1.5	24
26	Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers. <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i> , 2004, 20, 102-124.	1.5	29
27	The relevance of private information in mechanism design. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2004, 117, 55-77.	1.1	93
28	Contestable Licensing. <i>BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy</i> , 2004, 3, .	0.2	1
29	The effectiveness of English auctions. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2003, 43, 214-238.	0.8	70
30	Corruption and Openness. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2003, , .	0.4	12
31	A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2002, 14, 439-464.	0.4	71
32	Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities. <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i> , 2002, 43, 303-324.	4.7	54
33	The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules. <i>Review of Economic Design</i> , 2002, 7, 331-340.	0.3	12
34	The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2000, 67, 309-326.	5.4	4
35	Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2000, 12, 183-204.	0.4	101
36	Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1999, 66, 679-691.	5.4	34

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37	Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1999, 85, 91-121.	1.1	19
38	Termination and Coordination in Partnerships. <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i> , 1999, 8, 191-221.	0.8	11
39	Termination and Coordination in Partnerships. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 1998, , .	0.4	0
40	Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common Beliefs. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1996, 12, 162-164.	0.8	17
41	Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1996, 16, 77-96.	0.8	43
42	On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 1995, 29, 195-212.	0.5	8
43	Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital, and Poverty. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	9
44	Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	12
45	Geography, Transparency and Institutions. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6
46	Markets Versus Negotiations: The Emergence of Centralized Markets. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	7
47	The Benefit of Collective Reputation. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	1
48	The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	2
49	Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0
50	Optimal Design Settlement Devices for Cases of Disputed Liability: Fee-Shifting Rules and Pleadings Mechanisms. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0
51	Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	2
52	Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	2
53	Private Selection and Arbitrator Impartiality. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0
54	The Benefit of Collective Reputation. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0