

Zvika Neeman

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

54
papers

1,216
citations

471509

17
h-index

454955

30
g-index

55
all docs

55
docs citations

55
times ranked

618
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2000, 12, 183-204.	0.4	101
2	Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2012, 122, 933-956.	3.6	101
3	The relevance of private information in mechanism design. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2004, 117, 55-77.	1.1	93
4	Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics. <i>Review of Financial Studies</i> , 2010, 23, 1089-1119.	6.8	88
5	On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2006, 74, 213-233.	4.2	75
6	A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i> , 2002, 14, 439-464.	0.4	71
7	The effectiveness of English auctions. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2003, 43, 214-238.	0.8	70
8	Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities. <i>Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</i> , 2002, 43, 303-324.	4.7	54
9	Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1996, 16, 77-96.	0.8	43
10	Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2009, 7, 377-387.	3.5	43
11	Geography, Transparency, and Institutions. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 2017, 111, 622-636.	3.7	42
12	Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1999, 66, 679-691.	5.4	34
13	STATUS AND POVERTY. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2010, 8, 413-420.	3.5	33
14	Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers. <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i> , 2004, 20, 102-124.	1.5	29
15	Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach. <i>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization</i> , 2005, 21, 285-314.	1.5	24
16	Corruption and Openness. <i>B E Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy</i> , 2008, 8, .	0.9	24
17	On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i> , 2006, 26, 536-556.	0.8	23
18	Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2013, 148, 473-501.	1.1	20

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1999, 85, 91-121.	1.1	19
20	Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2006, 56, 121-134.	0.8	18
21	Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common Beliefs. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1996, 12, 162-164.	0.8	17
22	Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach. <i>Journal of Legal Studies</i> , 2015, 44, S133-S159.	0.4	17
23	Differential Performance in High Versus Low Stakes Tests: Evidence from the Gre Test*. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2019, 129, 2916-2948.	3.6	17
24	Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets. <i>B E Journal of Theoretical Economics</i> , 2010, 10, .	0.2	16
25	The benefit of collective reputation. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2019, 50, 787-821.	2.3	14
26	THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT [*] . <i>Journal of Industrial Economics</i> , 2010, 58, 642-660.	1.3	13
27	The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules. <i>Review of Economic Design</i> , 2002, 7, 331-340.	0.3	12
28	Corruption and Openness. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2003, , .	0.4	12
29	Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	12
30	Termination and Coordination in Partnerships. <i>Journal of Economics and Management Strategy</i> , 1999, 8, 191-221.	0.8	11
31	Conspicuous Consumption, Human Capital, and Poverty. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	9
32	Does Information about Arbitrators's Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?. <i>Journal of Legal Studies</i> , 2013, 42, 369-397.	0.4	9
33	On determining the importance of attributes with a stopping problem. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> , 1995, 29, 195-212.	0.5	8
34	Personality traits and strategic behavior: Anxiousness and aggressiveness in entry games. <i>Journal of Economic Psychology</i> , 2014, 42, 136-147.	2.2	7
35	Markets Versus Negotiations: The Emergence of Centralized Markets. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	7
36	Geography, Transparency and Institutions. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	How Bayesian Persuasion Can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022, 14, 186-215.	1.2	6
38	The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 67, 309-326.	5.4	4
39	Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13, 238-272.	1.2	4
40	The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
41	Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
42	Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
43	Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2008, 164, 52-67.	0.2	1
44	Consumer Fraud, Misrepresentation and Reliance. International Review of Law and Economics, 2018, 54, 95-105.	0.8	1
45	The Benefit of Collective Reputation. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
46	Contestable Licensing. BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2004, 3, .	0.2	1
47	Termination and Coordination in Partnerships. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998, , .	0.4	0
48	Robustness against inefficient manipulation. Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 29, 55-67.	0.8	0
49	Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2008, 164, 130-133.	0.2	0
50	The rarity of consistent aggregators. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, 108, 146-149.	0.5	0
51	Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
52	Optimal Design Settlement Devices for Cases of Disputed Liability: Fee-Shifting Rules and Pleadings Mechanisms. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
53	Private Selection and Arbitrator Impartiality. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
54	The Benefit of Collective Reputation. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0