
Jay Pil Choi

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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ΙΛΥ ΡΙΙ ΟΗΟΙ

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	CORRUPTION AND THE SHADOW ECONOMY*. International Economic Review, 2005, 46, 817-836.	1.3	235
2	Net neutrality and investment incentives. RAND Journal of Economics, 2010, 41, 446-471.	2.3	183
3	TYING IN TWOâ€SIDED MARKETS WITH MULTIâ€HOMING [*] . Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, 58, 607-626.	1.3	167
4	Brand Extension as Informational Leverage. Review of Economic Studies, 1998, 65, 655-669.	5.4	146
5	Cooperative R&D with product market competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1993, 11, 553-571.	1.2	132
6	Privacy and personal data collection with information externalities. Journal of Public Economics, 2019, 173, 113-124.	4.3	131
7	A model of piracy. Information Economics and Policy, 2006, 18, 303-320.	3.5	114
8	Technology transfer with moral hazard. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001, 19, 249-266.	1.2	106
9	Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications. RAND Journal of Economics, 2000, 31, 717.	2.3	105
10	PATENT POOLS AND CROSSâ€LICENSING IN THE SHADOW OF PATENT LITIGATION*. International Economic Review, 2010, 51, 441-460.	1.3	95
11	Market structure and the timing of technology adoption with network externalities. European Economic Review, 1998, 42, 225-244.	2.3	87
12	Optimal tariffs and the choice of technology Discriminatory tariffs vs. the â€~Most Favored Nation' clause. Journal of International Economics, 1995, 38, 143-160.	3.0	77
13	Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements. Economic Journal, 2004, 114, 83-101.	3.6	66
14	MERGERS WITH BUNDLING IN COMPLEMENTARY MARKETS [*] . Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, 56, 553-577.	1.3	65
15	Broadcast competition and advertising with free entry: Subscription vs. free-to-air. Information Economics and Policy, 2006, 18, 181-196.	3.5	59
16	Net Neutrality, Business Models, and Internet Interconnection. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2015, 7, 104-141.	1.2	57
17	The dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect. Journal of Public Economics, 2003, 87, 427-443.	4.3	54
18	The Economics of Repeated Extortion. RAND Journal of Economics, 2004, 35, 203.	2.3	38

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19	Alternative damage rules and probabilistic intellectual property rights: Unjust enrichment, lost profits, and reasonable royalty remedies. Information Economics and Policy, 2009, 21, 145-157.	3.5	38
20	Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2016, 118, 816-840.	1.4	38
21	Do converters facilitate the transition to a new incompatible technology? A dynamic analysis of converters. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996, 14, 825-835.	1.2	34
22	A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The ''Boomerang'' Effect and Grant-Back Clauses*. International Economic Review, 2002, 43, 803-829.	1.3	34
23	The economics of politically-connected firms. International Tax and Public Finance, 2009, 16, 605-620.	1.0	31
24	NETWORK SECURITY: VULNERABILITIES AND DISCLOSURE POLICY [*] . Journal of Industrial Economics, 2010, 58, 868-894.	1.3	30
25	Strategic Second Sourcing by Multinationals*. International Economic Review, 2004, 45, 579-600.	1.3	29
26	Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2012, 30, 528-540.	1.2	28
27	<scp>Customer Information Sharing: Strategic Incentives and New Implications</scp> . Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2010, 19, 403-433.	0.8	27
28	Patent pools, litigation, and innovation. RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46, 499-523.	2.3	27
29	Net Neutrality, Network Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2018, 66, 172-204.	1.3	25
30	Standardization and experimentation: Ex ante vs. ex post standardization. European Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 12, 273-290.	1.8	24
31	Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, 3, 724-733.	3.5	24
32	A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13, 283-337.	1.2	24
33	A Theory of Patent Portfolios. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, 9, 315-351.	1.2	23
34	Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, 21, 1179-1200.	1.2	21
35	Multiâ€Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013, 61, 987-1022.	1.3	19
36	Optimal compatibility in systems markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 2015, 90, 106-118.	0.8	19

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37	A MODEL OF PATENT TROLLS. International Economic Review, 2018, 59, 2075-2106.	1.3	19
38	Cooperative R&D with moral hazard. Economics Letters, 1992, 39, 485-491.	1.9	18
39	INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*. International Economic Review, 2012, 53, 635-658.	1.3	18
40	Transfer pricing regulation and tax competition. Journal of International Economics, 2020, 127, 103367.	3.0	18
41	Tying in Twoâ€Sided Markets with Multiâ€Homing: Corrigendum and Comment. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2017, 65, 872-886.	1.3	14
42	The Effects of Integration on R&D Incentives in Systems Markets. NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking, 2003, 5, 21-32.	0.9	13
43	VAPORWARE*. International Economic Review, 2010, 51, 653-669.	1.3	13
44	Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2019, 28, 73-88.	0.8	13
45	Protectionist response to import competition in declining industries reconsidered. European Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 17, 193-201.	1.8	9
46	A Leverage Theory of Reputation Building with Co-Branding: Complementarity in Reputation Building. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007, , .	0.4	9
47	Dynamic R&D Competition, Research Line Diversity, and Intellectual Property Rights. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1993, 2, 277-297.	0.8	8
48	Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2014, 23, 899-924.	0.8	8
49	Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments. Economic Theory, 2018, 65, 891-915.	0.9	8
50	Optimal cross-licensing arrangements: Collusion versus entry deterrence. European Economic Review, 2019, 120, 103315.	2.3	8
51	Information concealment in the theory of vertical integration. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1998, 35, 117-131.	2.0	7
52	You are judged by the company you keep: Reputation leverage in vertically related markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, 61, 351-379.	1.2	6
53	FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents. Global Economic Review, 2016, 45, 233-250.	1.1	5
54	Market structure, incentive to patent and the pace of innovation. Economics Letters, 1990, 34, 277-283.	1.9	4

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55	Optimal certification policy, entry, and investment in the presence of public signals. RAND Journal of Economics, 2020, 51, 989-1013.	2.3	4
56	Communication of soft information: Reputation and imperfect enforcement of reporting quality. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2017, 136, 91-106.	2.0	3
57	Making sense of inefficient intrafirm transactions: A signalling approach. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1994, 12, 495-508.	1.2	2
58	Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation. SSRN Electronic Journal, O, , .	0.4	2
59	An equilibrium model of investment-reducing vertical integration. Research in Economics, 2016, 70, 659-676.	0.8	1
60	Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, 3, 724-733.	3.5	1
61	Big Media: Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets. Information Economics and Policy, 2015, 32, 1.	3.5	Ο