Klaus M Schmidt

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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62 papers 14,040 citations

201674 27 h-index 53 g-index

63 all docs

63
docs citations

times ranked

63

7842 citing authors

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Paying for open access. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2022, 200, 273-286.	2.0	1
2	Focusing climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment can promote cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2021, 118 , .	7.1	12
3	Das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen. Perspektiven Der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2021, 22, 4-16.	0.4	0
4	Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020, 70, 102521.	1.2	2
5	Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies. Management Science, 2020, 66, 2194-2212.	4.1	7
6	Genome-wide association analyses of risk tolerance and risky behaviors in over 1 million individuals identify hundreds of loci and shared genetic influences. Nature Genetics, 2019, 51, 245-257.	21.4	536
7	You Owe Me. American Economic Review, 2017, 107, 493-526.	8.5	44
8	Delegating pricing power to customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2017, 136, 125-140.	2.0	32
9	Buyer and seller data from pay what you want and name your own price laboratory markets. Data in Brief, 2017, 12, 513-517.	1.0	0
10	Competition and incentives. European Economic Review, 2017, 98, 111-125.	2.3	6
11	Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2017, 119, 489-511.	1.4	9
12	Auctions versus negotiations: the effects of inefficient renegotiation. RAND Journal of Economics, 2017, 48, 647-672.	2.3	17
13	Pay what you want as a pricing model for open access publishing?. Communications of the ACM, 2017, 60, 29-31.	4.5	10
14	Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	2
15	REFERENCE POINTS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2015, 13, 98-129.	3.5	39
16	<i>Pay What You Want</i> as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets. Management Science, 2015, 61, 1217-1236.	4.1	101
17	Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation. Review of Economic Studies, 2015, 82, 297-332.	5.4	43
18	Complementary Patents and Market Structure. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2014, 23, 68-88.	0.8	22

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	JEEA-FBBVA Lecture 2012: USE AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: A BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013, 11, 711-742.	3.5	26
20	Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2013, 169, 4.	0.2	12
21	Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs. American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 834-864.	8.5	90
22	Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, , .	0.4	10
23	Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, , .	0.4	8
24	Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, , .	0.4	4
25	Social Preferences and Competition. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2011, 43, 207-231.	1.6	26
26	On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2010, 73, 101-108.	2.0	93
27	The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories. Perspektiven Der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2009, 10, 14-30.	0.4	10
28	Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights. Economic Journal, 2008, 118, 1262-1284.	3.6	54
29	Two tales on resale. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2008, 26, 1448-1460.	1.2	23
30	Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines. American Economic Review, 2007, 97, 177-181.	8.5	96
31	Fairness and Contract Design. Econometrica, 2007, 75, 121-154.	4.2	367
32	Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories. Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, 2006, 1, 615-691.	0.2	575
33	Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Finance. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006, , .	0.4	7
34	Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment. American Economic Review, 2006, 96, 1912-1917.	8.5	208
35	The Economics of Covenants as a Means of Efficient Creditor Protection. European Business Organization Law Review, 2006, 7, 89-94.	2.2	11
36	The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004, , .	0.4	25

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37	Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004, , .	0.4	31
38	Fairness and Incentives in a Multiâ€ŧask Principal–Agent Model. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004, 106, 453-474.	1.4	164
39	Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Finance, 2003, 58, 1139-1166.	5.1	416
40	Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002, , .	0.4	21
41	Der Markt fýr Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen. Perspektiven Der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2002, 3, 235-255.	0.4	16
42	Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision. Econometrica, 2002, 70, 2225-2264.	4.2	63
43	Contract Renegotiation and Option Contracts. , 2002, , 432-436.		1
44	The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation. European Economic Review, 2000, 44, 393-421.	2.3	71
45	Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices. European Economic Review, 2000, 44, 1057-1068.	2.3	101
46	A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114, 817-868.	8.6	8,441
47	Sequential Investments and Options to Own. RAND Journal of Economics, 1998, 29, 633.	2.3	140
48	Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition. Review of Economic Studies, 1997, 64, 191.	5.4	781
49	Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining, and Giveaways. , 1997, , 97-133.		19
50	Incomplete contracts and privatization. European Economic Review, 1996, 40, 569-579.	2.3	103
51	Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 69, 387-410.	1.1	32
52	The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1996, 12, 1-24.	1.5	272
53	Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem. RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, 26, 163.	2.3	350
54	The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts. Economics Letters, 1995, 48, 193-199.	1.9	109

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55	Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game. Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, 60, 114-139.	1.1	51
56	Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe. Journal of Comparative Economics, 1993, 17, 264-287.	2.2	33
57	Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests. Econometrica, 1993, 61, 325.	4.2	70
58	Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications., 0,, 208-257.		212
59	Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	10
60	Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
61	The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
62	Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2