

Winand Emons

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

41
papers

1,042
citations

623734

14
h-index

477307

29
g-index

41
all docs

41
docs citations

41
times ranked

396
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts. RAND Journal of Economics, 1997, 28, 107.	2.3	242
2	Credence goods monopolists. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001, 19, 375-389.	1.2	107
3	Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 1988, 46, 16-33.	1.1	91
4	Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort. International Review of Law and Economics, 2000, 20, 21-33.	0.8	70
5	THE THEORY OF WARRANTY CONTRACTS. Journal of Economic Surveys, 1989, 3, 43-57.	6.6	58
6	A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders. International Review of Law and Economics, 2003, 23, 253-259.	0.8	57
7	Escalating penalties for repeat offenders. International Review of Law and Economics, 2007, 27, 170-178.	0.8	56
8	On the Limitation of Warranty Duration. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1989, 37, 287.	1.3	39
9	US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2006, 27, 379-385.	2.5	36
10	On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical. Review of Economic Studies, 1991, 58, 375.	5.4	31
11	Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals. Journal of Public Economics, 1990, 42, 89-104.	4.3	30
12	Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2003, 159, 259.	0.2	26
13	The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon. Applied Economics, 2009, 41, 2867-2885.	2.2	25
14	Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders. Economic Inquiry, 2004, 42, 496-502.	1.8	20
15	Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees. American Law and Economics Review, 2006, 8, 20-32.	0.9	16
16	Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2012, 30, 352-360.	1.2	16
17	Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996, 14, 465-484.	1.2	14
18	PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE. Economic Inquiry, 2017, 55, 1833-1867.	1.8	13

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence. <i>Review of Industrial Organization</i> , 2018, 52, 403-427.	0.7	12
20	The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i> , 1994, 14, 479-491.	0.8	9
21	Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts. <i>European Journal of Law and Economics</i> , 2004, 17, 307-327.	1.1	9
22	The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion. <i>International Journal of Industrial Organization</i> , 2020, 70, 102619.	1.2	9
23	Asset prices and public information. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1991, 35, 1529-1542.	2.3	8
24	Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	7
25	Conditional versus Contingent Fees. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6
26	The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6
27	Why plaintiffs' attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts. <i>International Review of Law and Economics</i> , 2016, 47, 16-23.	0.8	5
28	Strategic communication with reporting costs. <i>Theory and Decision</i> , 2019, 87, 341-363.	1.0	4
29	Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	4
30	Perjury Versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity Or Quality Of Testimony. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	3
31	Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony. <i>Revue Economique</i> , 2020, Vol. 71, 429-457.	0.3	3
32	Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade. <i>Open Economies Review</i> , 1994, 5, 261-274.	1.6	2
33	Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2002, , .	0.4	2
34	Legal Fees and Lawyers' Compensation. , 2017, , .		2
35	Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Testimony. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	2
36	Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2015, , .	0.4	1

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	Conditional and Contingent Fees: A Survey of some Recent Results. , 2008, , 327-335.		1
38	Credence Goods: The Monopoly Case. , 2005, , 17-42.		0
39	The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018, , .	0.4	0
40	Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
41	Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0