David Wettstein

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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39	838	12	26
papers	citations	h-index	g-index
39	39	39	351 citing authors
all docs	docs citations	times ranked	

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Bidding for the Surplus: A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, 100, 274-294.	1.1	155
2	Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 135, 339-356.	1.1	103
3	Feasible and Continuous Implementation. Review of Economic Studies, 1989, 56, 603.	5.4	68
4	All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002, 50, 417-430.	1.3	58
5	Innovative activity and sunk cost. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, 21, 1111-1133.	1.2	56
6	Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment. American Economic Review, 2006, 96, 1351-1354.	8.5	56
7	Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach. Economic Theory, 2009, 39, 307-330.	0.9	48
8	The possibility of mixed-strategy equilibria with constant-returns-to-scale technology under Bertrand competition. Spanish Economic Review, 2000, 2, 65-71.	1.0	46
9	Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach. American Economic Review, 2002, 92, 1577-1587.	8.5	40
10	Efficient bidding with externalities. Games and Economic Behavior, 2006, 57, 304-320.	0.8	24
11	DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY. International Economic Review, 2016, 57, 881-914.	1.3	24
12	An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments. Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 127, 296-308.	1.1	16
13	Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments. Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48, 111-123.	0.8	12
14	Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1996, 25, 65-71.	0.5	11
15	Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, 31, 106-120.	0.8	11
16	Using the Penalized Likelihood Method for Model Selection with Nuisance Parameters Present only under the Alternative: An Application to Switching Regression Models. Journal of Time Series Analysis, 2005, 26, 715-741.	1.2	11
17	Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 157, 236-254.	1.1	10
18	Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, 52, 208-222.	1.1	9

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19	Forming efficient networks. Economics Letters, 2005, 87, 83-87.	1.9	9
20	The optimal design of rewards in contests. Review of Economic Design, 2015, 19, 327-339.	0.3	8
21	The provision of public goods via advertising. Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 54, 309-321.	4.3	7
22	A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets. Review of Economic Design, 1999, 4, 219-230.	0.3	7
23	Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: A Generalized Bidding Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
24	Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm. Mathematical Social Sciences, 1994, 28, 51-58.	0.5	5
25	Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities. International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, 39, 177-184.	0.5	5
26	Extended switching regression models with time-varying probabilities for combining forecasts. European Journal of Finance, 2006, 12, 455-472.	3.1	4
27	Values for environments with externalities – The average approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 2018, 108, 49-64.	0.8	4
28	Continuous implementation in economics with incomplete information. Games and Economic Behavior, 1992, 4, 463-483.	0.8	3
29	Cost sharing: efficiency and implementation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1999, 32, 489-502.	0.8	3
30	Surplus Sharing with a Twoâ€Stage Mechanism. International Economic Review, 2000, 41, 399-409.	1.3	3
31	The extended switching regression model: allowing for multiple latent state variables. Journal of Forecasting, 2007, 26, 457-473.	2.8	3
32	Rational bidding in a procurement auction with subjective evaluations. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2016, 44, 60-67.	1.2	3
33	Patents and pools in pyramidal innovation structures. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020, 69, 102580.	1.2	3
34	Two-stage contests with preferences over style. Economic Theory, 2022, 74, 1141-1161.	0.9	3
35	Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1995, 24, 201-216.	0.8	2
36	Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment. American Economic Review, 2006, 96, 1351-1354.	8.5	2

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37	Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 75, 413-423.	0.8	O
38	The Optimal Design of Rewards in Contests. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
39	Two-Stage Contests with Preferences Over Style. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	O