## **Stephen Morris**

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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172457 144013 8,075 86 29 57 citations h-index g-index papers 86 86 86 2254 docs citations times ranked citing authors all docs

#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice. Review of Economic Studies, 2022, 89, 2687-2722.	5.4	7
2	Counterfactuals with Latent Information. American Economic Review, 2022, 112, 343-368.	<b>8.</b> 5	2
3	Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey. Japanese Economic Review, 2020, 71, 7-34.	1.3	4
4	Notes on "refinements and higher order beliefs― Japanese Economic Review, 2020, 71, 35-41.	1.3	3
5	Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model. Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15, 1399-1434.	0.8	8
6	Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks. American Economic Review, 2019, 109, 2823-2854.	8.5	17
7	First-price auctions with general information structures. , 2019, 16, 27-37.		0
8	Revenue Guarantee Equivalence. American Economic Review, 2019, 109, 1911-1929.	<b>8.</b> 5	16
9	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 2019, 57, 44-95.	6.5	290
10	Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices. AEA Papers and Proceedings American Economic Association, 2018, 108, 572-577.	1.2	21
11	Global Games. , 2018, , 5323-5330.		0
12	Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability. Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 168, 329-371.	1.1	3
13	Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2017, 89, 71-87.	3.4	95
14	Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 104, 744-759.	0.8	12
15	Expectations, Networks, and Conventions. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017, , .	0.4	17
16	ILLIQUIDITY COMPONENT OF CREDIT RISK – THE 2015 LAWRENCE R. KLEIN LECTURE. International Economic Review, 2016, 57, 1135-1148.	1.3	58
17	Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium. American Economic Review, 2016, 106, 586-591.	8.5	102
18	Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. Theoretical Economics, 2016, 11, 487-522.	0.8	255

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19	Common belief foundations of global games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 163, 826-848.	1.1	35
20	The Limits of Price Discrimination. American Economic Review, 2015, 105, 921-957.	8.5	242
21	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	3
22	Information and Market Power. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	10
23	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015, , .	0.4	2
24	Information and volatility. Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 158, 427-465.	1.1	51
25	Game Theory Models in Finance. Profiles in Operations Research, 2014, , 17-41.	0.4	6
26	Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information. Econometrica, 2013, 81, 1251-1308.	4.2	155
27	Ex Post Implementation. World Scientific Series in Economic Theory, 2012, , 97-152.	1.4	1
28	The Robustness of Robust Implementation. World Scientific Series in Economic Theory, 2012, , 357-373.	1.4	0
29	Contagious Adverse Selection. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2012, 4, 1-21.	2.7	49
30	Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types. American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 319-324.	8.5	9
31	ROBUST RATIONALIZABILITY UNDER ALMOST COMMON CERTAINTY OF PAYOFFS. Japanese Economic Review, 2012, 63, 57-67.	1.3	3
32	Robust implementation in general mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71, 261-281.	0.8	41
33	The robustness of robust implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146, 2093-2104.	1.1	11
34	Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 2009, 76, 1175-1204.	5.4	89
35	Ex post implementation. Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 63, 527-566.	0.8	43
36	Global Games. , 2008, , 1-7.		2

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37	An Ascending Auctions for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty. American Economic Review, 2007, 97, 125-130.	8.5	8
38	Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2007, 54, 2205-2230.	3.4	50
39	Optimal Communication. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2007, 5, 594-602.	3.5	94
40	Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets. Review of Financial Studies, 2006, 19, 719-752.	6.8	441
41	Catalytic finance: When does it work?. Journal of International Economics, 2006, 70, 161-177.	3.0	123
42	Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con: Reply. American Economic Review, 2006, 96, 453-455.	8.5	102
43	Robust Mechanism Design. Econometrica, 2005, 73, 1771-1813.	4.2	411
44	Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 124, 45-78.	1.1	81
45	Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2005, 2005, 1-66.	1.5	128
46	Liquidity Black Holes *. Review of Finance, 2004, 8, 1-18.	6.3	263
46	Liquidity Black Holes *. Review of Finance, 2004, 8, 1-18.  Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 87-113.	<b>6.3 5.4</b>	263
	Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review		
47	Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 87-113.	5.4	223
47	Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 87-113.  Coordination risk and the price of debt. European Economic Review, 2004, 48, 133-153.  Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. Journal of Economic Theory,	5.4 2.3	223 364
48	Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 87-113.  Coordination risk and the price of debt. European Economic Review, 2004, 48, 133-153.  Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 108, 1-44.	5.4 2.3 1.1	223 364 254
47 48 49 50	Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 87-113.  Coordination risk and the price of debt. European Economic Review, 2004, 48, 133-153.  Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 108, 1-44.  Social Value of Public Information. American Economic Review, 2002, 92, 1521-1534.	5.4 2.3 1.1	223 364 254 1,406
47 48 49 50	Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders. Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71, 87-113.  Coordination risk and the price of debt. European Economic Review, 2004, 48, 133-153.  Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 108, 1-44.  Social Value of Public Information. American Economic Review, 2002, 92, 1521-1534.  Came Theory Models in Finance., 2002, , 17-48.  Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2000, 15,	5.4 2.3 1.1 8.5	223 364 254 1,406

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55	The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information. Econometrica, 1997, 65, 1283.	4.2	236
56	The rationality and efficacy of decisions under uncertainty and the value of an experiment. Economic Theory, 1997, 9, 309-324.	0.9	4
57	Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1997, 6, 171-190.	0.6	44
58	Risk, uncertainty and hidden information. Theory and Decision, 1997, 42, 235-269.	1.0	29
59	The rationality and efficacy of decisions under uncertainty and the value of an experiment. Economic Theory, 1997, 9, 309-324.	0.9	2
60	The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory. Economics and Philosophy, 1995, 11, 227-253.	0.3	368
61	p-Dominance and Belief Potential. Econometrica, 1995, 63, 145.	4.2	187
62	Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty. Economic Theory, 1995, 6, 453-467.	0.9	33
63	Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty. Economic Theory, 1995, 6, 453-467.	0.9	10
64	Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information. Econometrica, 1994, 62, 1327.	4.2	222
65	Global Games: Theory and Applications. , 0, , 56-114.		424
66	Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From?. SSRN Electronic Journal, $0,  ,  .$	0.4	2
67	Information and Market Power. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
68	Coordination and Continuous Choice. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
69	Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
70	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
71	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	8
72	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6

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73	The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	7
74	Information and Volatility. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
75	Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
76	Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
77	Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
78	Common Belief Foundations of Global Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	11
79	Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	5
80	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
81	Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	17
82	Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
83	Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
84	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
85	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
86	Information and Interaction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6