

Dirk Bergemann

List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

95
papers

4,343
citations

279798

23
h-index

214800

47
g-index

96
all docs

96
docs citations

96
times ranked

1333
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2022, 131, 275-291.	0.8	11
2	Calibrated Click-Through Auctions. , 2022, , .		1
3	The economics of social data. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2022, 53, 263-296.	2.3	43
4	Progressive participation. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2022, 17, 1007-1039.	0.8	1
5	Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?. , 2022, , .		0
6	Information, market power, and price volatility. <i>RAND Journal of Economics</i> , 2021, 52, 125-150.	2.3	9
7	Nonlinear pricing with finite information. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2021, 130, 62-84.	0.8	4
8	Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2020, 15, 1399-1434.	0.8	8
9	First-price auctions with general information structures. , 2019, 16, 27-37.		0
10	Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i> , 2019, 57, 235-274.	6.5	64
11	Markets for Information: An Introduction. <i>Annual Review of Economics</i> , 2019, 11, 85-107.	5.5	122
12	Revenue Guarantee Equivalence. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2019, 109, 1911-1929.	8.5	16
13	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. <i>Journal of Economic Literature</i> , 2019, 57, 44-95.	6.5	290
14	The Design and Price of Information. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2018, 108, 1-48.	8.5	118
15	Markets for Information: An Introduction. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2018, , .	0.4	5
16	Should First-Price Auctions Be Transparent?. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2018, 10, 177-218.	1.2	13
17	Bandit Problems. , 2018, , 665-670.		0
18	Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2017, 168, 329-371.	1.1	3

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19	Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2017, 104, 744-759.	0.8	12
20	Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2017, , .	0.4	6
21	Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2016, 106, 586-591.	8.5	102
22	Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2016, 11, 487-522.	0.8	255
23	Selling Cookies. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2015, 7, 259-294.	1.2	101
24	The Limits of Price Discrimination. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2015, 105, 921-957.	8.5	242
25	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2015, , .	0.4	3
26	Information and Market Power. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2015, , .	0.4	10
27	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2015, , .	0.4	2
28	Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 159, 819-853.	1.1	31
29	Information and volatility. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 158, 427-465.	1.1	51
30	Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 159, 679-701.	1.1	22
31	Sequential information disclosure in auctions. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 159, 1074-1095.	1.1	37
32	Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2014, , .	0.4	2
33	An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design. <i>Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics</i> , 2013, 8, 169-230.	0.5	17
34	Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2013, 81, 1251-1308.	4.2	155
35	The Limits of Price Discrimination. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2013, , .	0.4	6
36	Multi-dimensional mechanism design with limited information. , 2012, , .		11

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	Ex Post Implementation. World Scientific Series in Economic Theory, 2012, , 97-152.	1.4	1
38	Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types. American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 319-324.	8.5	9
39	Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, , .	0.4	1
40	Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, , .	0.4	1
41	Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, 2012, , 1-10.	0.3	5
42	Robust implementation in general mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 71, 261-281.	0.8	41
43	Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media. RAND Journal of Economics, 2011, 42, 417-443.	2.3	192
44	Efficient Search by Committee. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011, , .	0.4	0
45	Robust monopoly pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146, 2527-2543.	1.1	115
46	The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism. Econometrica, 2010, 78, 771-789.	4.2	195
47	Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 2009, 76, 1175-1204.	5.4	89
48	Pricing without Priors. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008, 6, 560-569.	3.5	99
49	Ex post implementation. Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 63, 527-566.	0.8	43
50	Bandit Problems. , 2008, , 1-7.		21
51	An Ascending Auctions for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty. American Economic Review, 2007, 97, 125-130.	8.5	8
52	Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137, 580-609.	1.1	212
53	Robust Mechanism Design. Econometrica, 2005, 73, 1771-1813.	4.2	411
54	Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design. Econometrica, 2002, 70, 1007-1033.	4.2	264

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55	Experimentation in Markets. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2000, 67, 213-234.	5.4	90
56	Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning. <i>Journal of Banking and Finance</i> , 1998, 22, 703-735.	2.9	596
57	Information in Mechanism Design. , 0, , 186-221.		16
58	Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	4
59	Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From?. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	2
60	Information and Market Power. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0
61	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6
62	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	8
63	Information Design: A Unified Perspective. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6
64	First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0
65	Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	6
66	Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	5
67	Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	4
68	Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	4
69	Selling Cookies. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	3
70	The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	7
71	Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	4
72	Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	4

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73	Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
74	Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	4
75	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
76	Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	17
77	The Design and Price of Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
78	Information and Market Power. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
79	The Economics of Social Data. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	8
80	Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
81	Selling Cookies. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
82	Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
83	Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
84	Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design'. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
85	Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
86	Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
87	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	3
88	Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
89	First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
90	The Design and Price of Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1

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91	Information and Interaction. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	6
92	The Economics of Social Data. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0
93	Counterfactuals with Latent Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	1
94	Counterfactuals with Latent Information. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
95	Uniform Pricing Versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0