
Georgy Egorov

List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: https://exaly.com/author-pdf/11881532/publications.pdf Version: 2024-02-01



#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
1	Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data. American Political Science Review, 2009, 103, 645-668.	3.7	416
2	A Political Theory of Populism *. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2013, 128, 771-805.	8.6	282
3	DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011, 9, 903-930.	3.5	249
4	From Extreme to Mainstream: The Erosion of Social Norms. American Economic Review, 2020, 110, 3522-3548.	8.5	157
5	Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs. American Economic Review, 2012, 102, 1446-1476.	8.5	116
6	Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies. Review of Economic Studies, 2008, 75, 987-1009.	5.4	109
7	Political Economy in a Changing World. Journal of Political Economy, 2015, 123, 1038-1086.	4.5	49
8	Cool to be Smart or Smart to be Cool? Understanding Peer Pressure in Education. Review of Economic Studies, 2019, 86, 1487-1526.	5.4	46
9	Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. Review of Economic Studies, 2016, 83, 932-968.	5.4	39
10	Delegation and nonmonetary incentives. Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 171, 101-135.	1.1	34
11	Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Reevaluating De Tocqueville*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2018, 133, 1041-1105.	8.6	34
12	Divided we stay home: Social distancing and ethnic diversity. Journal of Public Economics, 2021, 194, 104328.	4.3	24
13	The killing game: A theory of non-democratic succession. Research in Economics, 2015, 69, 398-411.	0.8	18
14	Institutional change and institutional persistence. , 2021, , 365-389.		18
15	Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?. American Economic Review, 2009, 99, 298-303.	8.5	17
16	Political model of social evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2011, 108, 21292-21296.	7.1	17
17	Comment on "Commitment vs. Flexibility". Econometrica, 2013, 81, 2113-2124.	4.2	17
18	Elections in Non-Democracies. Economic Journal, 2021, 131, 1682-1716.	3.6	16

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#	Article	IF	CITATIONS
19	Scapegoating during Crises. AEA Papers and Proceedings American Economic Association, 2022, 112, 151-155.	1.2	10
20	Strategic Communication With Minimal Verification. Econometrica, 2019, 87, 1867-1892.	4.2	8
21	Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009, , .	0.4	6
22	Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008, , .	0.4	4
23	Electoral Rules and the Quality of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
24	Political Economy in a Changing World. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	2
25	Persuasion on Networks. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019, , .	0.4	2
26	Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014, , .	0.4	1
27	Endogenous Property Rights. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013, , .	0.4	0
28	Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Re-Evaluating De Tocqueville. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, ,	0.4	0
29	Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Re-Evaluating De Toqueville. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	0