

# Guillermo Ordonez

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/11861784/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

17  
papers

916  
citations

1163117

8  
h-index

1058476

14  
g-index

20  
all docs

20  
docs citations

20  
times ranked

303  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	The supply and demand for safe assets. <i>Journal of Monetary Economics</i> , 2022, 125, 132-147.	3.4	21
2	Asymmetric Information and Sovereign Debt: Theory Meets Mexican Data. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2022, 130, 2055-2109.	4.5	3
3	Sovereign Debt Auctions in Turbulent Times. <i>AEA Papers and Proceedings American Economic Association</i> , 2022, 112, 526-530.	1.2	0
4	Good Booms, Bad Booms. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2020, 18, 618-665.	3.5	76
5	Political Booms, Financial Crises. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2020, 128, 507-543.	4.5	47
6	Fighting Crises with Secrecy. <i>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</i> , 2020, 12, 218-245.	2.7	9
7	Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2019, , .	0.4	3
8	Leverage dynamics and credit quality. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2019, 183, 183-212.	1.1	7
9	Sustainable Shadow Banking. <i>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</i> , 2018, 10, 33-56.	2.7	47
10	Confidence banking and strategic default. <i>Journal of Monetary Economics</i> , 2018, 100, 101-113.	3.4	14
11	Banks as Secret Keepers. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2017, 107, 1005-1029.	8.5	260
12	Comment on "Credit market frictions and political failure" by Aney, Gatak and Morelli. <i>Journal of Monetary Economics</i> , 2016, 81, 65-69.	3.4	0
13	Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 2015, 130, 415-464.	8.6	33
14	Collateral Crises. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2014, 104, 343-378.	8.5	279
15	Reputation from nested activities. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2013, 52, 915-940.	0.9	2
16	The Asymmetric Effects of Financial Frictions. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2013, 121, 844-895.	4.5	61
17	Deleveraging versus Default. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	1