

# Thayer Morrill

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

Source: <https://exaly.com/author-pdf/11158546/publications.pdf>

Version: 2024-02-01

17  
papers

299  
citations

1040056

9  
h-index

1125743

13  
g-index

17  
all docs

17  
docs citations

17  
times ranked

125  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	An alternative characterization of top trading cycles. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2013, 54, 181-197.	0.9	45
2	Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms. <i>American Economic Journal: Economic Policy</i> , 2018, 10, 187-213.	3.1	38
3	Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2017, 9, 1-27.	1.2	35
4	(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2020, 87, 1837-1875.	5.4	33
5	Two simple variations of top trading cycles. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2015, 60, 123-140.	0.9	28
6	Making just school assignments. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2015, 92, 18-27.	0.8	28
7	An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm. <i>International Journal of Game Theory</i> , 2013, 42, 19-28.	0.5	25
8	Obvious manipulations. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2020, 185, 104970.	1.1	20
9	The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments. <i>Experimental Economics</i> , 2019, 22, 918-953.	2.1	17
10	Competitive equilibria in school assignment. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2018, 108, 269-274.	0.8	8
11	Sequential Kidney Exchange. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2014, 6, 265-285.	1.2	7
12	What you don't know can help you in school assignment. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 2020, 120, 246-256.	0.8	6
13	Petty Envy When Assigning Objects. , 2016, , .		4
14	How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money: Designing Information Systems that are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair. <i>Information Systems Research</i> , 2021, 32, 335-355.	3.7	3
15	Family ties: School assignment with siblings. <i>Theoretical Economics</i> , 2022, 17, 89-120.	0.8	2
16	STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST-VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS. <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , 2014, 52, 1219-1230.	1.8	0
17	Obvious Manipulations. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	0