

# Torsten Persson

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

56  
papers

10,968  
citations

109321

35  
h-index

189892

50  
g-index

69  
all docs

69  
docs citations

69  
times ranked

3731  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2009, 99, 1218-1244.	8.5	847
2	Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 1989, 104, 325.	8.6	776
3	Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 2014, 28, 99-120.	5.9	662
4	Comparative Politics and Public Finance. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2000, 108, 1121-1161.	4.5	509
5	State Capacity, Conflict, and Development. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2010, 78, 1-34.	4.2	490
6	Electoral Rules and Corruption. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2003, 1, 958-989.	3.5	486
7	The size and scope of government:. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1999, 43, 699-735.	2.3	433
8	Designing institutions for monetary stability. <i>Journal of Monetary Economics</i> , 1993, 39, 53-84.	0.4	401
9	Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change. <i>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</i> , 2009, 1, 88-126.	2.7	332
10	Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2010, 77, 1329-1352.	5.4	305
11	Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2004, 94, 25-45.	8.5	296
12	Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2006, 96, 319-324.	8.5	251
13	Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1996, 64, 623.	4.2	232
14	The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1992, 59, 689.	5.4	225
15	Constitutions and Economic Policy. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 2004, 18, 75-98.	5.9	219
16	Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies. <i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science</i> , 2007, 2, 155-188.	1.1	216
17	Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2017, 107, 2204-2242.	8.5	212
18	Taxation and Development. <i>Handbook of Public Economics</i> , 2013, , 51-110.	2.6	210

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Wars and State Capacity. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2008, 6, 522-530.	3.5	172
20	Who Becomes A Politician?*. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 2017, 132, 1877-1914.	8.6	153
21	Current Account Dynamics and the Terms of Trade: Harberger-Laursen-Metzler Two Generations Later. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 1985, 93, 43-65.	4.5	141
22	Representative democracy and capital taxation. <i>Journal of Public Economics</i> , 1994, 55, 53-70.	4.3	117
23	Deficits and intergenerational welfare in open economies. <i>Journal of International Economics</i> , 1985, 19, 67-84.	3.0	114
24	Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 1998, 108, 310-327.	3.6	113
25	Exchange rate policy, wage formation and credibility. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1988, 32, 1621-1636.	2.3	98
26	Does centralization increase the size of government?. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1994, 38, 765-773.	2.3	98
27	Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy. <i>Handbook of Macroeconomics</i> , 1999, , 1397-1482.	1.5	91
28	Repression or Civil War?. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2009, 99, 292-297.	8.5	87
29	The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 2016, 110, 559-578.	3.7	84
30	FRAGILE STATES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2011, 9, 371-398.	3.5	76
31	Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2006, 74, 193-212.	4.2	71
32	The Causes and Consequences of Development Clusters: State Capacity, Peace, and Income. <i>Annual Review of Economics</i> , 2014, 6, 927-949.	5.5	58
33	Do constitutions cause large governments? Quasi-experimental evidence. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 2002, 46, 908-918.	2.3	52
34	Education and Military Rivalry. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2019, 17, 376-412.	3.5	51
35	Weak States and Steady States: The Dynamics of Fiscal Capacity. <i>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</i> , 2013, 5, 205-235.	2.7	45
36	Comparative Politics and Public Finance. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 1997, , .	0.4	43

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	Time-consistent fiscal policy and government cash-flow. <i>Journal of Monetary Economics</i> , 1984, 14, 365-374.	3.4	42
38	Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1998, 42, 685-694.	2.3	42
39	Chapter 38 Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination. <i>Handbook of International Economics</i> , 1995, , 1973-2030.	2.6	41
40	Consequences of Constitutions. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2004, 2, 139-161.	3.5	41
41	The Size and the Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 1999, , .	0.4	32
42	Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 0, , .	0.4	27
43	Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2006, , .	0.4	26
44	Resilient Leaders and Institutional Reform: Theory and Evidence. <i>Economica</i> , 2016, 83, 584-623.	1.6	26
45	Democratic Values and Institutions. <i>American Economic Review Insights</i> , 2019, 1, 59-76.	3.2	25
46	Options for Economic and Political Reform in Sweden. <i>Economic Policy</i> , 1993, 8, 219.	2.3	24
47	<i>Political Economics and Public Finance</i> **We thank a number of colleagues â€” especially Alan Auerbach, David Baron, Tim Besley, Francesco Daveri, Avinash Dixit, and Gerard Roland â€” and Ph.D. students â€” especially Gisela Waisman â€” for comments on earlier drafts. Christina L�nnblad and Alessandra Startari provided editorial assistance. The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the European Commission (a TMR-Grant), and Bocconi University supported the underlying research.. <i>Handbook of Public Economics</i> , 2002, 3, 1549-1659.	2.6	23
48	JEEA-FBBVA LECTURE 2017: The Dynamics of Environmental Politics and Values. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2019, 17, 993-1024.	3.5	19
49	Culture, institutions, and policy. , 2021, , 463-489.		15
50	Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example. , 1998, , 28-66.		13
51	Choosing Ethnicity: The Interplay Between Individual and Social Motives. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2021, 19, 1203-1248.	3.5	12
52	Empirical Examinations of the Information Sets of Economic Agents. <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> , 1988, 103, 251.	8.6	6
53	Regulation, financial buffer stocks, and short-run adjustment. <i>European Economic Review</i> , 1989, 33, 1545-1565.	2.3	3
54	Political Institutions, Economic Approaches To. , 2008, , 1-8.		1

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
55	International Monetary Policy Coordination. , 2001, , 27-43.		0
56	Political Institutions, Economic Approaches To. , 2018, , 10440-10446.		0