

# Debraj Ray

## List of Publications by Year in descending order

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Version: 2024-02-01

79  
papers

8,662  
citations

81839

39  
h-index

95218

68  
g-index

81  
all docs

81  
docs citations

81  
times ranked

3343  
citing authors

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
1	On the Measurement of Polarization. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1994, 62, 819.	2.6	1,058
2	Conflict and Distribution. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1999, 87, 379-415.	0.5	397
3	Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2004, 72, 1737-1772.	2.6	379
4	Inequality as a Determinant of Malnutrition and Unemployment: Theory. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 1986, 96, 1011.	1.9	365
5	A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1999, 26, 286-336.	0.4	358
6	Ethnicity and Conflict: An Empirical Study. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2012, 102, 1310-1342.	4.0	348
7	Equilibrium Binding Agreements. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1997, 73, 30-78.	0.5	317
8	A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1993, 60, 463.	2.9	307
9	Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 2001, 95, 663-672.	2.6	303
10	Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2011, 101, 1345-1374.	4.0	279
11	A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints. <i>Econometrica</i> , 1989, 57, 615.	2.6	259
12	On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2008, 98, 2185-2202.	4.0	234
13	Persistent Inequality. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2003, 70, 369-393.	2.9	231
14	Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 1996, 63, 491.	2.9	219
15	Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1989, 1, 295-326.	0.4	188
16	Coalition formation as a dynamic process. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2003, 110, 1-41.	0.5	185
17	Aspirations and Inequality. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2017, 85, 489-519.	2.6	178
18	Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2001, 109, 138-190.	3.3	173

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
19	Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1998, 80, 292-331.	0.5	172
20	Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict. <i>Journal of Peace Research</i> , 2008, 45, 163-182.	1.5	159
21	Coalitional Power and Public Goods. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2001, 109, 1355-1384.	3.3	145
22	Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2003, 70, 87-113.	2.9	142
23	An Extension of a Measure of Polarization, with an application to the income distribution of five OECD countries. <i>Journal of Economic Inequality</i> , 2007, 5, 1-19.	2.0	140
24	Implications of an Economic Theory of Conflict: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India. <i>Journal of Political Economy</i> , 2014, 122, 719-765.	3.3	134
25	A Theory of Occupational Choice with Endogenous Fertility. <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , 2012, 4, 1-34.	0.7	113
26	Ethnicity and Conflict: Theory and Facts. <i>Science</i> , 2012, 336, 858-865.	6.0	113
27	A MODEL OF ETHNIC CONFLICT. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2011, 9, 496-521.	1.9	112
28	The Farsighted Stable Set. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2015, 83, 977-1011.	2.6	110
29	The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2002, 70, 547-582.	2.6	103
30	Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2006, 96, 257-279.	4.0	89
31	Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2002, 92, 818-849.	4.0	82
32	Conflict and Development. <i>Annual Review of Economics</i> , 2017, 9, 263-293.	2.4	82
33	A consistent bargaining set. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 1989, 49, 93-112.	0.5	75
34	Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements. <i>Review of Economic Studies</i> , 2007, 74, 1125-1147.	2.9	63
35	Uneven Growth: A Framework for Research in Development Economics. <i>Journal of Economic Perspectives</i> , 2010, 24, 45-60.	2.7	60
36	Dynamic equilibria with unemployment due to undernourishment. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 1993, 3, 61-85.	0.5	57

#	ARTICLE	IF	CITATIONS
37	ASPIRATION-BASED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING IN REPEATED INTERACTION GAMES: AN OVERVIEW. <i>International Game Theory Review</i> , 2001, 03, 159-174.	0.3	54
38	Constrained egalitarian allocations. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> , 1991, 3, 403-422.	0.4	53
39	Coalition Formation. <i>Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications</i> , 2015, 4, 239-326.	1.3	53
40	Certified Random: A New Order for Coauthorship. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2018, 108, 489-520.	4.0	50
41	Status, Intertemporal Choice, and Risk-Taking. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2012, 80, 1505-1531.	2.6	45
42	Why does asset inequality affect unemployment? A study of the demand composition problem. <i>Journal of Development Economics</i> , 1991, 35, 69-92.	2.1	42
43	Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2006, 96, 1321-1332.	4.0	42
44	Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart. <i>Journal of Economic Theory</i> , 2006, 131, 71-100.	0.5	42
45	Is Equality Stable?. <i>American Economic Review</i> , 2002, 92, 253-259.	4.0	39
46	Aspirations and Economic Behavior. <i>Annual Review of Economics</i> , 2020, 12, 715-746.	2.4	37
47	Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects. <i>Economic Journal</i> , 2007, 117, 922-935.	1.9	34
48	Information and Enforcement in Informal Credit Markets. <i>Economica</i> , 2016, 83, 59-90.	0.9	34
49	Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set. <i>Econometrica</i> , 2019, 87, 1763-1779.	2.6	33
50	Dynamic optimization on a non-convex feasible set: Some general results for non-smooth technologies. <i>Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie</i> , 1984, 44, 151-175.	0.4	31
51	Aspirations, Segregation, and Occupational Choice. <i>Journal of the European Economic Association</i> , 2010, 8, 139-168.	1.9	25
52	What's New in Development Economics?. <i>American economist, The</i> , 2000, 44, 3-16.	0.5	23
53	On the dynamics of inequality. <i>Economic Theory</i> , 2006, 29, 291-306.	0.5	22
54	Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation. <i>SSRN Electronic Journal</i> , 2003, , .	0.4	20

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55	A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	20
56	Social decision rules are not immune to conflict. Economics of Governance, 2001, 2, 59-67.	0.6	18
57	Introduction to development theory. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137, 1-10.	0.5	17
58	Inequality and Markets: Some Implications of Occupational Diversity. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, 2, 38-76.	0.7	17
59	Wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy. Journal of Development Economics, 1991, 37, 227-264.	2.1	16
60	Informal Insurance in Social Networks. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004, , .	0.4	16
61	Decoding India's Low Covid-19 Case Fatality Rate. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 2021, 22, 27-51.	1.2	16
62	Comparing Polarization Measures. , 2012, , .		14
63	Aspirations and the Development Treadmill. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 2016, 17, 309-323.	1.2	14
64	SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND SEGREGATION IN SKILL ACCUMULATION. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, 8, 388-400.	1.9	10
65	Endogenous Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements. SSRN Electronic Journal, 0, , .	0.4	10
66	Games of Love and Hate. Journal of Political Economy, 2020, 128, 1789-1825.	3.3	9
67	Growth, automation, and the long-run share of labor. Review of Economic Dynamics, 2022, 46, 1-26.	0.7	9
68	Informal Insurance, Enforcement Constraints, and Group Formation. , 2005, , 430-446.		8
69	Development Economics. , 2008, , 1-20.		8
70	Social decision rules are not immune to conflict. , 2003, , 193-201.		5
71	A Dynamic Incentive-Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*. Economic Record, 2008, 84, S2.	0.2	4
72	The Phelps-Koopmans theorem and potential optimality. International Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 6, 11-28.	0.4	3

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73	Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox. , 2008, , 379-388.		2
74	What's New in Development Economics?. , 2004, , 235-258.		1
75	Poverty and Desequalization. Journal of Globalization and Development, 2010, 1, .	0.1	1
76	Groups in conflict: Private and public prizes. Journal of Development Economics, 2022, 154, 102759.	2.1	1
77	Dynamic Coalition Formation from a Bargaining Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004, , .	0.4	0
78	Games of Love and Hate. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018, , .	0.4	0
79	Development Economics. , 2018, , 2817-2836.		0